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Does the Harm Principle Justify Criminal Drug Statutes 
Against Drug Use? 
 
By Kyle J. Lucas 
Department of Philosophy 
kyle.j.lucas@wmich.edu 
 
According to a recent article published in the British Medical Journal Open, the efforts 
attempting to control the global illegal drug market are failing. Over the past decades in the 
U.S., drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and cannabis have decreased in their inflation-adjusted 
price while the purity of such drugs have increased.
i
 What is more, the U.S. spends billions of 
dollars annually attempting to reduce drug use and its negative consequences. In fiscal year 
2015, President Obama has requested $25.4 billion for such purposes, of which $9.2 billion 
will be spent on domestic law enforcement.
ii
 Nevertheless, in recent years—for example 
between 2002-2007—there was only a .2% drop in users who depend on, or abuse, illegal 
drugs.
iii
 In addition, in 2010 of the 1,362,028 prisoners sentenced under state jurisdiction, 
237,000 (or approximately 17%) were convicted for drug offenses; of the 197,050 prisoners 
sentenced under federal jurisdiction, 94,600 (or approximately 48%) were convicted for drug 
offenses.
iv
  
These facts provide motivation, I believe, to enquire into a fundamental question with 
respect to illegal drugs: Why is recreational drug use a crime?
v
 We should be careful to note 
here at the outset that this question is not concerned with the prohibitions involving drug 
manufacturers or drug sellers; rather, the question centers upon the drug user: Why do we 
consider the act of using certain drugs as a form of criminal conduct?
vi
   
Arguments put forth to justify criminal statutes against drug use are numerous and 
generally fall into three main categories: Moral perfectionism, harm to self, and harm to 
others.
vii
 I believe harm to others is the strongest rationale of the trio capable of justifying the 
criminal statutes.
viii
 I will, therefore, focus solely on the arguments put forth that drug use 
should be illegal because it harms others. I will adopt the Harm Principle, first articulated by 
John Stuart Mill, as the framework to approach this question. The first part of this paper will 
briefly characterize the Harm Principle and some of the difficulties in using this principle. 
Next, I will look at what I believe are some of the strongest arguments which the Harm 
Principle can put forth to justify the illicit status of drugs. In particular, I will claim that 
increased risks of harm to others and societal harm are the strongest arguments. Increased 
risks of harm will primarily be approached drawing upon the work of Douglas Husak and 
several criteria which he puts forth as possible methods of evaluating when risks of harm can 
be justifiably proscribed. Societal harm will be approached using Joel Feinberg’s model of 
aggregate harm. I will argue that both of these models fail to provide a sufficient rationale to 
justify the entire scope of the current criminal statutes against drug use.  
 
The Harm Principle 
 
The Harm Principle was formulated by John Stuart Mill in his work On Liberty. Mill 
described his work as examining “the nature and limits of the power which can be 
legitimately exercised by society over the individual.”ix For Mill, a fundamental problem with 
law hinged upon the tension between liberty and authority. In order to protect liberty while at 
the same time justifying the coercive nature of law, Mill formulated one, crucial principle: 
“the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with 
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which 
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power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, 
is to prevent harm to others.”x  
Perhaps we should first get clear on who, exactly, the “others” are which the community 
is protecting. Mill seems to suggest that, at the very least, the others are members of the 
civilized community in question. For our intents and purposes, this would apply to any U.S. 
citizen living under U.S. jurisdiction. We might raise questions here about the status of non-
U.S. citizens living in the United States, U.S. citizens living abroad, as well as non-U.S. 
citizens living outside of the United Stated; however, I think this restricted notion of the other 
will allow us to investigate the question at hand without seriously affecting the argument of 
this paper. We might also be concerned with the status of those whom the others are being 
protected against (i.e. those who harm the others); however, from Mill’s definition above, we 
can see that he is only concerned with members of the community in question (“any of their 
number”). Thus, in our case, we can again restrict this group to U.S. citizens living under U.S. 
jurisdiction. 
We should also note some other major obstacles which face this principle before 
proceeding. Perhaps the most notable difficulty is to discern whether an action affects only the 
actor doing the action or society and others. After all, it would seem almost every action of an 
individual affects society in some manner. Mill was not insensitive to this difficulty. He 
asked, “How…can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference 
to other members? No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do 
anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his 
near connections.”xi In response, Mill argued that only when there is definite damage, or 
definite risks of damage, does liberty reach its bounds.
xii
 Mill provides an example to 
demonstrate his point. He held that that “If…a man, through intemperance or extravagance, 
becomes unable to pay his debts, or, having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family, 
becomes from the same cause incapable of supporting or educating them, he is deservedly 
reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it is for the breach of duty to his family or 
creditors, not for the extravagance.”xiii What Mill seems to be suggesting is that actions too 
remote on the causal chain cannot warrant proscription. We will deal with this conception and 
related problems in more detail below. 
Another difficulty faced by those seeking to employ the Harm Principle is to give a clear 
definition of what constitutes as harm. This has proved exceedingly difficult. Of notable 
interest, Joel Feinberg has attempted to give an adequate formulation, arguing that harm is a 
setback to interest.
xiv
 Generally speaking, the idea is that when someone is harmed, they are 
worse off than they would have been otherwise. This formulation also has its problems which 
are beyond the scope of this paper.
xv
 For our intents and purposes, using a putative conception 
of harm will suffice. In other words, we will recognize harm when we see it. Thus, although 
giving a precise definition of harm might be difficult, when we look at a particular case 
involving drug use and harm to others, we should be able to recognize whether the case in 
question constitutes as involving harm to others.   
A final difficulty in using the Harm Principle, and of notable importance for the purposes 
of this paper, is to establish how much harm, or how much risk of harm, is sufficient to justify 
criminalizing an action. This problem is perhaps the most manageable of the three. Joel 
Feinberg noted two important factors involved in assessing when this is the case: the 
magnitude of harm and the likelihood that the action will result in harm. The relationship 
between the magnitude and likelihood of harm and the justification for criminalizing a 
conduct is spelled out by Feinberg: “the greater the probability of harm, the less grave the 
harm need be to justify coercion; the greater the gravity of the envisioned harm, the less 
probable it need be.”xvi Feinberg refers to the combination of the likelihood and the magnitude 
of harm as risk, which is how I will employ the term for the remainder of this paper. To better 
see the relationship of risk with respect to the likelihood of harm and the magnitude of harm, 
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consider the following cases which both carry significant risk: (1) Driving 80 mph down a 
country road at night carries a relatively low probability of causing harm to some other 
person; however, should a harm occur, the magnitude would be great. (2) Second hand smoke 
has a high probability of causing harm to others, but the magnitude is relatively low. 
Attempting to quantify the exact level of risk needed to criminalize harm is beyond the scope 
of this paper; rather, I will use a comparative approach and examine actions which carry a 
similar risk to use of illicit drugs.   
 
The Harm Principle and Drug Use 
 
We are now in a position to apply the Harm Principle to test whether drug use causes 
sufficient harm to others or poses a risk of harm to others significant enough to warrant the 
current statutes. What is immediately apparent is that in most all cases of drug use there is not 
direct harm to others. In other words, it is not the case that as a direct consequence of using 
drug [x] another person [y] is harmed. For instance, in only a few exceptions is it the case that 
a heroin user, by consuming or injecting heroin, causes direct harm to another person. Husak 
helps explain: “One possible way to describe this distinction is to say that drug use is 
indirectly harmful to others, whereas these other crimes are directly harmful to others. These 
labels draw the following distinction. Every act of burglary or rape is harmful to others…By 
contrast, not every act of drug use is harmful to others.”xvii One notable exception involves 
pregnant women.
xviii
 We should note that this seems to fall outside of the scope of “others” 
with respect to our definition above. Yet even if we do consider a fetus as an “other”, I do not 
think this is what most people have in mind when they attempt to justify the criminal drug 
statutes. Should cases such as pregnancy be a major concern, a law specifically oriented 
towards pregnant mothers using drugs would seem more appropriate than criminalizing the 
conduct in general.  
It seems, then, the strongest arguments which can be brought forth using the Harm 
Principle must involve risks of harm, where the act of using a certain drug is not in itself 
harmful, but it raises the likelihood that some other harmful act occurs. In order to approach 
this rationale, we will look at two general types of harm to others laid out by Feinberg: risks 
of harm to private persons and risks of harm to the public, society, or state.
xix
  
 
Risks of Harm to Others (Private Persons) 
 
Using the Harm Principle, one can argue that certain activities carry a risk of harm to others 
which should be criminalized by law. Generally speaking, of the two factors involved in risk, 
it is the likelihood that some harmful event obtains which is the significant factor in question. 
Husak helps us spell out this rationale. He holds that such laws “prohibit some conduct x 
because it impermissibly increases the likelihood of harm y. Conduct x does not invariably 
harm anyone, but it impermissibly increases the likelihood that a harm y…will occur.”xx 
Husak proceeds to describe how this might occur: “Sometimes the probability of y is raised 
because the agent who performs x is more likely to commit a subsequent harmful act.”xxi 
Some clear examples of current criminal statutes which prohibit activities based upon the 
increased risk of harm include drinking and driving and speeding. For instance, drinking and 
driving increases the likelihood of a subsequent harmful act (e.g. a car accident). Although the 
likelihood of a car accident still might remain relatively low at certain blood alcohol content 
levels, car accidents carry a significant magnitude of harm. Thus, even a slight increase in 
likelihood might raise the risk of harm to such an extent we deem the action should be 
prohibited. 
Increased risks of harm are some of the most common arguments evoked against drug 
use, such as the connections made between drug use and crime. For example, we might put 
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forth the argument that someone who takes drug [x] is more likely to commit some harmful 
crime [y]; thus, we can say there is an increased risk of harm from taking drug [x]. As Husak 
notes, however, the scope of when it is justifiable to criminalize activities which create 
increased risks of harm has not been clearly defined. In response to this difficulty, Husak has 
put forth four principles which he argues should be requirements to justify making certain 
conducts criminal based upon their capacity to increase the likelihood of some harm. 
Although I take these to be prima facie principles insofar as they may have exceptions, I 
believe they offer a meaningful framework for evaluating risks of harm created by drug use.   
The first principle Husak refers to as the “Inchoate Principle.” According to Husak, 
“Conduct x should not be criminalized on the ground that it increases the likelihood of harm y 
unless conduct that directly and deliberately causes y should also be prohibited.”xxii The idea 
seems most fitting in cases where some act [x] increases the likelihood of a harm [y] 
indirectly through some other conduct [z]. Suppose, for instance, that we deem drinking and 
driving [x] as unacceptably increasing the likelihood of a terrible car accident [y]. Often, this 
risk is indirect; for instance, alcohol can create a certain disposition to drive recklessly [z]. 
Reckless driving directly causes terrible car accidents. Thus, it would be strange indeed if we 
prohibited drinking and driving but not reckless driving.
xxiii
 With respect to drug use, such 
reasoning is prevalent. For example, Husak points out that many argue drug use causes an 
increased likelihood that people become unproductive and lazy, which in turn carries a risk 
that they might harm society through a reduction of productivity towards the common good. 
However, neither being unproductive nor lazy are forms of criminal conduct themselves, 
despite the fact that they directly cause the loss of productivity for the common good. 
There may be exceptions to this principle that relate to drug use. For example, having a 
mental disorder is not criminal, yet it might be the direct cause of many harmful acts. 
Supposing there to be a drug which throws someone into this state of mind, we might think 
this qualifies as a reason to criminalize the drug but not the mental disorder itself. This 
reasoning carries weight and may very well hold for some drugs; however, I am not sure it 
will hold in most cases under further scrutiny. I think the burden of proof lies upon those 
attempting to uphold the prohibitions to demonstrate this is the case. There are at least two 
conditions which should be met for such cases: First, whatever the mental disorder, it would 
need to carry a significant risk of harm to others. Second, the drug itself would need to carry a 
certain likelihood that people who use it develop the mental disorder. What is more, by 
looking at alcohol as a comparative example, I think we have reason to be hesitant that the 
above objection will work in most cases of illegal drugs.  Generally speaking, consuming 
alcohol seems to carry a similar likelihood that a person will develop a risk-prone mental 
disorder as do most illegal drugs. Some rationale must be provided, then, as to why we deem 
such risks associated with alcohol consumption as falling outside the bounds of criminal law 
while those of the well-known illicit drugs fall within its scope.    
The second principle is the “Triviality Principle.” Husak holds that “[c]onduct x should 
not be criminalized on the ground that it increases the likelihood of harm y unless y is a 
substantial harm.”xxiv By substantial, I take Husak to be referring to the magnitude of the 
harm. In other words, if the magnitude of the harm is relatively low, then even under 
conditions where there is a high likelihood of harm, its risk would not warrant criminalizing 
the conduct. Thus, for example, consider a lazy drug user: Suppose we have the tools to 
calculate that using drug [x] will significantly increase the likelihood of a loss of productivity 
[z] which causes [y] amount of harm in each instance. Even if the likelihood of harm is high, 
it would seem in such cases that the magnitude of harm is significantly low—too low, 
perhaps, to criminalize the conduct.   
This principle faces a significant challenge. It may be argued that, although it is true each 
individual instance carries a small amount of harm, taken as a whole, the aggregate is quite 
substantial. Much the same reasoning can be applied to littering: An individual case of 
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littering does not cause much harm to the environment, but taken as the whole the harm can 
be quite substantial. I will not deal extensively with this challenge here, as it will fall under 
“societal harm” and be dealt with in the next section.  
The final two principles deal with causation. Husak’s third principle is the “Remoteness 
Principle.” He argues “[c]onduct x should not be criminalized on the ground that it increases 
the likelihood of harm y unless x and y are sufficiently proximate.”xxv In other words, if an 
action [x] is quite distant in the causal chain connecting the action with the end harm, this 
might be a good reason to deny that action [x] should be criminalized. Generally speaking, to 
see if some action is the proximate cause of some effect, a foreseeability test is used where we 
would ask the question: Could harm [y] have been reasonably predicted given action [x]? 
Determining whether some action can be considered the proximate cause of an event has 
caused a considerable amount of debate in jurisprudence. This issue is beyond the scope of 
this paper; however, a few brief comments should suffice for our purposes: First, we should 
note that concerns with proximate causation are not the same as those which are concerned 
with the “cause in fact”, also known as the “but-for” cause. In many cases, we may want to 
say that had a person not taken a certain drug [x], harm [y] would not have happened. This 
would pass the “but-for” test, meaning that without action [x], harm [y] could not have 
occurred, but this does not necessitate that it is a proximate cause of the event (i.e. that it was 
foreseeable). By and large, I think most of the harms which are connected with drug use are 
too remote on the causal chain to warrant the criminal statutes under this principle.  Rather, I 
think what most people have in mind when they evoke a causation argument is that using drug 
[x] was the “but-for” cause of harm [y]. For instance, suppose someone takes drug [x]. This 
causes an addiction, which in turn causes numerous other events to take place, such as the 
user losing his job and money. At the end of the causal chain, the user commits a robbery and 
thereby causes harm [y]. We might say that drug use was the “but-for” cause of the harm 
(which will be dealt with more in the next principle); however, in terms of proximity, the use 
of the drug is quite remote from the actual harmful event.
xxvi
 I think it would be a hard case to 
make that the harm in question was foreseeable, thereby providing a justification for the 
prohibition against use of the drug. Thus, it seems this principle will come of short of being 
convincing in most cases. 
The fourth principle Husak terms the “Empirical Principle.” He holds “[c]onduct x should 
not be criminalized on the ground that it increases the likelihood of harm y unless there is an 
established causal connection between x and y in a reasonably high percentage of cases.”xxvii 
The concern here is not how close action [x] lies to harm [y] on the causal chain, but whether 
there is a strong causal connection between the two. This is perhaps the most powerful 
argument brought against drug use in favor of its criminalization, and I think it is what most 
people have in mind when they say that the use of a certain drug was the “but-for” cause 
behind some harm. Most commonly, this occurs in the form of arguing that drug use increases 
the likelihood of criminal behavior. There is certainly a strong correlation between drug use 
and crime.  With respect to violent crime, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 
“about 26% of the victims of violence reported that the offender was using drugs or 
alcohol.”xxviii In addition, Norman Miller and Sara Spratt, examining legal issues concerning 
drug and alcohol addiction, note that more than 50% of murderers were using alcohol, drugs, 
or both, at the time of their crime.
xxix
 With respect to prisoners, the BJS notes “In the 2004 
Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities, 32% of state prisoners and 
26% of federal prisoners said they had committed their current offense while under the 
influence of drugs.”xxx 
At face value, these statistics make it seem reasonable to argue that, indeed, there is an 
established causal connection between drug use and criminal activity in a high percent of 
cases. Nevertheless, looking further into the issue, I think there are substantial objections 
against this argument. The first important point to call into consideration is what Husak refers 
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to as the “systemic” effect of drug use leading to crime. According to Husak, this category 
includes “offenses within dealing hierarchies to enforce normative codes, retaliate for real or 
imagined crimes of competitors or informers, resolve disputes involving territory or 
possession of drugs, punish customers who fail to pay debts, and so on.”xxxi Thus, part of the 
problem in obtaining reliable statistic between drug use and crime is that many of the crimes 
might be drug related in the sense that, if there were not legal statutes making drugs illegal in 
the first place, such crimes would have never taken place. In addition, the fact that someone 
involved with drugs happened to be using drugs in a drug-related crime should not come as a 
surprise. For instance, if a drug dealer commits assault against a client who does not pay, the 
correlation that the dealer was on drugs at the time of the crime does not necessarily imply 
causation (that drug use was the culprit causing the crime) or at any rate that drug use was the 
“root cause”: i.e. that the drug was the fundamental cause or initiator of the criminal act.    
Another reason to doubt that drug use, itself, is a significant causal agent in creating an 
increased likelihood of crime involves what Husak referred to as an “economic effect.”xxxii 
The basic argument here is that the correlation between drug use and crime can to a large 
extent be explained as resulting from the fact that drug users turn to crime in order to support 
their expensive drugs habits. Thus, it is not drug use per se that causes the criminal activity 
but rather the limited supply and high costs. These factors—caused largely by the legal 
sanctions placed upon drugs—result in drug users becoming poor and desperate to continue 
their habit. For instance, one could imagine that if alcohol were made illegal, there would be 
alcoholics who would commit crimes to get their drink. That drug users commit crimes in 
order to raise money for their drug habits is strongly corroborated by the BJS: “In 2004, 17% 
of state prisoners and 18% of federal inmates said they committed their current offense to 
obtain money for drugs.”xxxiii  
A third and perhaps most significant reason why we might call into doubt the causal 
connection is that, even supposing that drug use was a significant causal factor in crimes 
committed under the influence of drugs, there is a low likelihood that drug users actually 
commit crimes. Husak explains:  
 
Theorists who believe that drugs cause crime must explain why relatively few users of 
recreational drugs become criminals. Although the majority of criminals may be drug 
users, the majority of drug users are not (otherwise) criminals. Continued criminality is 
more predictive of drug use than continued drug use is predictive of criminality. 
Approximately 14.5 million people use an illicit drug each month. Only a tiny fraction is 
arrested for crimes, although no one knows how many commit offenses that are 
undetected. The fact that only a small minority of drug users resort to criminality raises a 
serious difficulty for those who conclude that LAD [laws against drugs] satisfies the 
conditions for justified anticipatory legislation.
xxxiv
 
  
Thus, taking into consideration the factors noted above, I believe we have reason to doubt that 
this principle sufficiently establishes a justification for the drug statutes.   
Using the four principles outlined by Husak help develop an account for when it is 
justifiable to criminalize actions which cause substantial risks of harm. As we can see, 
however, this argument faces considerable challenges if we are to be convinced. Nevertheless, 
there remains a strong case to be made that it is actually harm to society in general which 
justifies laws against drugs.  
 
Societal Harm 
 
According to Husak’s triviality principle, we should not criminalize risks of harm when the 
individual harm of each act is insignificant. Nevertheless, should we add each individual act 
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together, the aggregate harm to society can be quite significant. Thus, perhaps societal harm 
provides a convincing rationale to criminalize the risks of harm created by drug use.  
Societal harm, as argued by Feinberg, is a harm of public interest. Feinberg defines 
public interest as “a ‘common,’ or widely shared, specific interest.”xxxv It is a common interest 
which nearly all members of society have, for example, avoiding epidemic sicknesses, 
providing a sustainable environment in which one can live, and having economic prosperity. 
Acts can be considered harmful to society even if an individual act is relatively harmless 
itself. For instance, a single act of littering causes little harm. Nonetheless, the sum total of 
harm caused by all the individual acts in a given time might end up being quite substantial. If 
the aggregate of the harms push us past a certain unacceptable level, then we have a strong 
reason to prohibit such acts. Feinberg refers to these types of harm as “aggregate-harm.”xxxvi 
Thus, in the case of drugs, one might argue that although each individual use of a certain drug 
causes a small amount of harm, the aggregate is substantial enough to warrant the criminal 
statute.   
Since we are dealing with drugs already proscribed, it is not enough to merely take 
current aggregate to see whether we are past the unacceptable threshold. If one were to argue 
that even with the current proscriptions we are past the threshold, this would not be 
problematic, as this person would certainly not argue we should remove the prohibitions; 
however, even if we think that the current aggregate is below the threshold, we must ask a 
further question: What would happen to the aggregate level should we lift the prohibition on 
drugs? This involves that we make a prediction about how many people would participate in 
the activity (taking the drug in question) and project the change in the level of aggregate 
harm. We should take careful note here, then, that the current level of aggregate harm need 
not be past the threshold to justify proscribing an activity. For instance, for many illicit drugs, 
we might say that currently the aggregate harm is lower than the threshold required to justify 
proscription; however, should the drug in question be made legal, the aggregate might swell 
to an unacceptable level. Therefore, one seeking to justify the criminal status of drugs 
according to societal harm must convincingly argue that either drugs currently cause an 
unacceptable level of aggregate harm or would cause an unacceptable level if not proscribed.  
The later argument is what one might call the ‘epidemic scenario.’ The argument runs that if 
drugs were to be decriminalized or legalized, it would result in an epidemic of societal harm.  
Overall, societal harm seems to carry some weight at first glance; however, as we shall 
see, I believe it faces significant challenges. First, since there is no objective threshold which 
determines when there is enough societal harm to justify criminal sanctions, we must rely on 
comparative cases. Such cases do exist, and I think they leave us open to doubt the aggregate 
level is high enough to warrant proscription. In addition, I believe there is also reason to doubt 
an epidemic scenario on a scale which would push us past the aggregate threshold would 
occur.  
First, let us examine the argument that the current aggregate level of harm created by 
illicit drug use warrants its criminal status. This claim is open to doubt primarily on the 
grounds that there exists other activities which cause a greater aggregate harm which are not 
themselves proscribed. Most notably, this is the case with alcohol, which is interesting given 
its affinity with drug use and crime. It seems fairly uncontroversial that the amount of 
aggregate harm caused by alcohol is higher than that of most illicit drugs. Even if we assume 
that alcohol causes considerably less harm on average per user than most illicit drugs, the 
aggregate must still be far greater given that more people use and abuse alcohol than any 
illegal drug. But what is more, there is evidence that alcohol is one of the most socially 
harmful drugs in widespread use. For instance, recent research attempting to quantify the 
harm to society from substance abuse was conducted in Scotland. The study found that 
“[t]here was no stepped categorical distinction in harm between the different legal and illegal 
substances.”xxxvii On a scale of 0-3, the researchers averaged the scores of all users. The social 
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harm of alcohol was averaged at 2.70 coming in second only to heroin at 2.72. Other notable 
drugs included cocaine, which had a social harm score of 2.33, and cannabis which scored at 
1.61, second to last behind magic mushrooms which had a score of 1.60.
xxxviii
 
Three responses might be available to continue justifying the illicit status of drugs as a 
societal harm. First, one could argue that alcohol should, in fact, be illegal. I will not deal with 
this response as I do not believe most people actually hold it. If one were to use this line of 
reasoning, the issue would hinge upon the grey area of when there is sufficient harm to 
criminalize an activity. Second, one could argue that lifting the prohibitions on drug use 
would push us past the acceptable level of aggregate harm. I will deal with this criticism 
shortly. Finally, George Sher put forth the following argument, noting the parallels between 
illegal drugs and alcohol and stating that the arguments for criminalization of the two seem to 
stand or fall together: “the reason drugs take us past the threshold [referring to the permissible 
level of aggregate harm] is that alcohol has already gotten us part of the way there. It may be 
the case, in other words, that either alcohol or the use of drugs by itself would not produce 
more harms or bads than a reasonable society can tolerate, but that in combination they would 
produce harms and bads that surpass the threshold.”xxxix Ultimately, I think this argument 
stands or falls with the “epidemic scenario”, since this argument implies that should illicit 
drugs be decriminalized or legalized, then we would pass the harm threshold. 
This brings us to the final argument we will examine in favor of the laws against drug 
use. It is a common argument in defense of the prohibitions: If drug prohibitions are removed 
(the argument is also commonly applied to decriminalization policies as well), the aggregate 
level of harm will exceed the acceptable threshold. In other words, by legalizing drug use, 
there will be a surge in the number of users which will significantly increase the aggregate 
harm. This argument, however, faces a significant challenge. Husak argues that there is 
simply no empirical data supporting the idea that should proscriptions be removed, a large 
amount of people would turn to drug use. He references a work by Robert MacCoun and Peter 
Reuter, which found that few people said they abstained from drugs, or quit after using drugs, 
for legal reasons. If this is true, it implies that we should not expect a significant change in 
drug use should the prohibitions be lifted. In turn, we should not expect a substantial increase 
in the current level of aggregate harm.  
Part of the problem with the argument noted above is a lack of empirical evidence to 
support one side or the other. A recent case, however, corroborating the argument that use 
levels would not significantly change can be seen by looking at a decriminalization policy 
implemented by Portugal. A brief word about the policy: It is not a policy of legalization. 
Furthermore, drug trafficking is still criminalized. Possessing “for one’s own consumption” 
any of the well-known illicit drugs constitutes as an administrative offense, not a criminal 
offense. Administrative offenses can result in a fine between 25 euros and the minimum 
national wage; however, Glen Greenwald, reviewing the policy, notes “but such fines are 
expressly declared to be a last resort. Indeed, in the absence of evidence of addiction or 
repeated violations, the imposition of a fine is to be suspended.”xl Thus, despite not being 
legalized, users do not face harsh legal penalties. The effect on usage rates has been surprising 
and gives us reason to doubt what most supporters of criminalization argue. From 2001 (when 
the policy was implemented) to 2007, those aged 15-19 saw a slight decrease (2-3%) while 
those aged 20-24 saw a slight to mild increase (8-9%) in terms of their lifetime prevalence 
rates (how many people have consumed a certain drug over the course of their lifetime).
xli
 
Overall, then, there was only a slight increase in drug use by those aged 15-24. Granted, this 
policy was one of decriminalization and not of legalization; however, the “epidemic scenario” 
argument is commonly applied to both policies. This is not to say that if the argument fails 
with respect to decriminalization, then it also must fail with respect to legalization, but I 
believe this data gives us reason to doubt that an epidemic scenario would take place should 
drug use prohibitions be lifted altogether.
xlii
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Conclusion  
 
This paper sought to investigate whether the Harm Principle could provide a sufficient 
rationale to justify the current drug proscriptions. A few points are worth reviewing: Increased 
risks of harm are one of the most significant arguments used to justify the proscriptions 
against drug use. Using several principles laid down by Husak, I believe it evident that it is 
difficult to construct a wholly convincing argument that drug users create a risk of harm 
significant enough to justify the criminal statutes. Furthermore, the argument that drug users 
create enough social harm to justify the prohibitions also faces severe challenges. Thus, the 
Harm Principle does not provide a conclusive argument that drug users should face criminal 
sanctions. 
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